Through the Telescope of Typology: What Adam Should Have Done

Dennis Danielson

A number of studies over the past twenty years have drawn our attention to Milton's presentation of life before the Fall—its beauties, its celebration of human relationship, its opportunities for intellectual stimulation and moral development. We have become more aware also of how important that presentation of prelapsarian life is to Milton's theodicy, for if Adam and Eve had not been able to learn and develop in their unfallen state, then we as readers might feel it was good that they fell; if Adam and Eve did not have the moral and intellectual means to avoid falling, then we would inevitably blame their fall on God. Milton, however, seeing just what was at stake, produced a prelapsarian Adam and Eve whose persisting in righteousness and resisting of temptation the reader would consider both possible and desirable. They of course did not avoid falling. But we are meant to feel that they could have, and should have.¹

Even if we accept this argument, however, as I think we should, students of Paradise Lost still have to worry about that peculiar slice of time during which our assumptions as well as conclusions about pre-or postlapsarian life become confused—that slice of time, namely, after Eve has eaten the forbidden fruit but before Adam has actually joined her in transgressing God's sole command. The question here is this: once Eve has fallen, is Adam's sin inevitable? Or, perhaps, is it simply desirable? Given Eve's fall, does Adam face a dilemma: either to disobey God or else to break the bond of human love, whose goodness we perceive as fundamental? And if Adam has no choice but to reject the sinner with the sin, or else to accept the sin with the sinner, then will most of us applaud Adam's choosing the latter?

This, of course, is the case put so eloquently forty years ago by A. J. A. Waldock, who said that for us to condemn Adam's joining Eve in her fall would require our setting aside "one of the highest . . . of all human values: selflessness in love"; and that accordingly "Paradise Lost cannot take the strain at its centre, it breaks there" (54, 56). C. S. Lewis had speculated tentatively that Adam might have "scolded or chastised Eve and then interceded with God on her behalf" (127). Milton, after all, says merely that Adam "[submitted] to what seemed remediless" (emphasis added).² But William Empson's response is that "the poem . . . does not encourage us to think of an alternative plan," because for Adam to join in Eve's fall "seems inevitable" (189). Dennis Burden, by contrast, feels that once Eve has fallen, the time has come for Adam to divorce her (163-76).

I have long felt that Waldock's, Empson's, and


Burden's conclusions regarding Adam's fall are flawed. My purpose in this essay, however, is not so much to attempt a thorough refutation of them as merely to sketch a competing interpretation of Adam's choices that is both possible and more consistent with Milton's poem and project of theodicy. For particularly when read through the lens of biblical typology, *Paradise Lost* does indeed provide grounds for envisaging an alternative course of action that Adam could and should have taken.

The aspects of typology I refer to are well known. Adam is a type of Christ who is, as St. Paul says, "the last Adam" (1 Cor. 15:45). On the symmetry of this typological pairing are built the opening lines of both *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained*: "Of man's first disobedience . . . / till one greater man/Restore us"; "the happy garden . . . / By one man's disobedience lost . . . / Recovered . . . / By one man's firm obedience." In Book 11 of *Paradise Lost* Milton refers quite explicitly to Christ as "Our second Adam" (383). Furthermore, in the church fathers, complementing the typology of the first and second Adam there developed the conception of Mary as the second Eve, the second similarly making good what was defaced by the first: "Quos Evaev culpa damnavit, Mariae gratia solvit" (Those whom Eve's sin damned, Mary's grace saves). Thus Mary inherits Eve's title mater viventium, and the nurturing role of both women devolves upon the church, mater ecclesiæ, which was born from the riven side of Christ, just as Eve was taken from the side of Adam. As Augustine said, "Eva de latere dormientis, Ecclesia de latere patientis" (Eve from the side of the sleeping one, the church from the side of the suffering one; Migne 37:1785). And as Milton says in *Christian Doctrine*, "Christ's love for this invisible and immaculate church of his is figured as the love of husband for wife" (*Complete Prose* 6:500).

In *Paradise Lost* Milton draws most explicit attention to the typology of Eve and Mary. In that remarkable scene in Book 5, in which Eve stands naked before her angelic guest, Raphael greets her with "Hail"—"the holy salutation used / Long after to blest Marie, second Eve" (5.385-87). Medieval commentators and poets reveled in the fact that this salutation, the AVE (of the Ave Maria), spells EVA backwards and so reveals how the obedience of Mary reverses the effects of Eve's disobedience (Guldan 45, 58-59, 121, 135; C. Brown numbers 41, 45, 131). Milton, however, deftly places that first "Hail" in a context in which as yet there is nothing that needs reversing: the calamity (das Unheil) has not yet happened. The typology thus functions mainly by way of similarity, not contrast. In Book 5 it draws attention therefore not so much to Mary's inheriting Eve's title as, in a literary sense, Eve's inheriting Mary's: it impresses upon us Eve's being full of grace, her being unfallen, immaculate.

This effect of typology is not as peculiar as may first appear, for in its literary function, typology is always a two-way street. Not only does a "shadowy type" prefigure the "truth," but also, once we have seen that truth, that antitype, we are ever after more aware of that type's shadowiness. For example, once Moses is seen as a type of Christ (*PL* 12:240-44), Moses's character is simultaneously brightened by our awareness of how he is like Christ and dimmed by our awareness of how he is unlike Christ. In this sense, part of the literary meaning of every type consists in its being an antitype manqué. Eve's case in Book 5 is simply peculiar in the degree to which it recalls the similarity rather than the contrast: she is simply immaculata, not immaculata manqué, at least not yet.

Even after her fall, however, Eve retains something of Mary's nurturing and redemptive role. She is repeatedly linked with her function within the "protevangelium" of Genesis 3:15: the bruising of the serpent's head, fulfilled, as Milton says, "When Jesus son of Mary second Eve, / Saw Satan fall" (10.183-84). But also in her own right Eve functions redemptively. Most notably, in Book 10, she tells Adam she will importune heaven, that all The sentence [of death] from thy head removed may light On me, sole cause to thee of all this woe, Me me only just object of his ire.

(933-36)
There is something in this vignette of the frantic mother wishing she could take upon her own shoulders responsibility for the sins of a wayward son. But her hopelessly heroic gesture is also genuinely exemplary, as Adam's response confirms. Like a child—or a childish adult—who hears a good idea and inwardly rebukes himself for not having thought of it first, he rejects the idea, answering Eve's humility with words of defensive condescension:

If prayers
Could alter high decrees, I to that place
Would speed before thee, and be louder heard,
That on my head all might be visited,
Thy frailty and infirm sex forgiven.

(952–56)

However, while it is true that their fallenness precludes either Adam's or Eve's now taking "all" upon his or her own head, such was not the case in that peculiar slice of time after Eve sinned but before Adam joined her in disobedience.

What Eve does in the scene I have just been describing, as in Caravaggio's depiction of Mary showing the young Christ how to crush the serpent's head (see illustration), is to demonstrate how true love wins the victory over evil. Mary in Caravaggio shows us and the second Adam how it will be done; Eve in Milton shows us and the first Adam how it might have been done. For as Christ was the second Adam, so Adam might have been a first Christ. But once he joins Eve in disobedience, we thenceforth see him merely as antitype manqué.

In *Paradise Lost* the Son also, in Book 3, offers to take all the punishment upon his own head, though in his case it is the righteous one offering to die for the unrighteous—"Behold me then, me for him, life for life / I offer, on me let thine anger fall" (236–37)—words ironically echoed by Eve's hope that the sentence of God might "light / On me ... / Me me only just object of his ire" (10.934–36). The echo is ironic not only because it comes from the mouth of a fallen creature but also because it comes from Eve and not from Adam, the one who, as Irene Samuel, Marshall Grossman, and others have pointed out, had the opportunity to offer himself for fallen Eve, the just for the unjust. He did not do that, but I think we are meant to feel that he could have, and should have.

Consider Adam's decision to sin with Eve, against the background of Christ as Adamic antitype. (For in *Paradise Lost* it is a background, since for the reader the offered self-sacrifice of Christ in Book 3 precedes Adam's temptation in Book 9.) Faced with Eve now fallen, the as yet unfallen Adam declares:

I with thee have fixed my lot,
Certain to undergo like doom, if death
Consort with thee, death is to me as life;
So forcible within my heart I feel
The bond of nature draw me to my own,
My own in thee, for what thou art is mine;
Our state cannot be severed, we are one,
One flesh; to lose thee were to lose my self.

(9.952–59)

Quite independently, both Adam and Eve in their interior monologues leading up to this scene speculate about the possibility of God's creating "another Eve" (9.828, 911). But do we not, when we hear Adam speaking here of the bond of nature, remember another Adam, who had, for the love of humankind, offered to join his nature to their nature, to be one flesh with them, and to die that they might have life—to be "in Adam's room / The head of all mankind, though Adam's son" (3.285–86)? In other words, does not our prior knowledge of the antitype inform our expectations of what possibilities are open to the type?

Yet critics such as Waldock have assumed that, for Adam, loving Eve means sinning with her, though in Christ we already have a demonstration that "to die with (or for)" does not entail "to sin with." Adam himself, in his interior monologue upon realizing Eve has sinned, seems to make the distinction: "HOW art thou lost ... / and now to death devote? / Rather how hast thou yielded to transgress" (9.900–02). But Eve interprets Adam's resolution to die as a resolution to sin—and to sin for love of her—"linked in love so dear, / To undergo with me one guilt, one crime, / If any be" (970–72). And in her exclamation "O glorious trial
of exceeding love, / Illustrious evidence, example high!” (9.961-62), we have a bitter parody of the angelic response to the Son's offer to die, though not to sin, “For man's offence” : “O unexampled love, / Love nowhere to be found less than divine!” (3.410-11).

The parody in this scene extends also to the language of the Bible itself, of Ephesians 5 — in which we behold that other layer of typology, not of Christ and Mary but of the mysterious marriage of Christ and the church (see also M. R. Brown). “For we are members of his body,” says St. Paul, “of his flesh, and of his bones” (Eph. 5.30). “The link of nature draw[s] me,” says Adam in Paradise Lost, “flesh of flesh, / Bone of my bone” (9.914-15). To Eve he declares, “to lose thee were to lose my self!” (9.959), and in one sense he must be biblically right, for as Paul says, “he that loveth his wife loveth himself” (Eph. 5.28). But the analogy between Adam-and-Eve and Christ-and-the-church breaks down precisely at the point where Adam chooses to sin with Eve rather than sinlessly face death for her. As biblically and Miltonically aware readers we have before us as we read Adam's temptation the model of Adam's antitype, of Christ's fusion of obedience and self-sacrificial love. Hear Ephesians 5 again: “Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ also loved the church, and gave himself for it” (25).

In facing the predicament of the fallen Eve, therefore, Adam faced no real dilemma between loving Eve and obeying God. In an act of dazzling heroism such as only an unfallen person could perform, he could have done what the fallen Eve wished she could do and what the second Adam ultimately did do: to take the punishment of fallen humanity upon himself, to fulfill exactly “The law of God,” as Michael puts it in Book 12, “Both by obedience and by love” (12.402-03). Of course we have trouble imagining what shape human history might thereafter have taken. The scenario is hypothetical, though nonetheless possible and important. Nothing in the poem in principle precludes it, and much in the poem proposes it.

In general in Paradise Lost Milton takes care to adumbrate an ongoing unfallen scenario for Adam and Eve if both remain obedient — one of continued learning, fruitfulness, and growth, their bodies at last turning “all to spirit, / Improved by tract of time” (5.497-98). For he sees that without such an unfallen scenario, the fall will appear inevitable or desirable, in which case what would be the use of his trying to justify God's ways to men?

Similarly with Adam's choice once Eve alone has eaten the forbidden fruit: as Waldock says so clearly, if Adam must choose between obeying God and selflessly loving Eve, then the poem cracks at its very center, because that would be a dilemma that it is not fair for God to allow Adam to face. But Paradise Lost, by means of the typology it calls into play combined with its own structure, adumbrates a third way with a clarity sufficient to undermine Waldock's conclusion. The loving offer of self-sacrifice by the second Adam in Book 3 back-grounds the non-self-sacrifice of the first Adam in Book 9. Furthermore, Eve's appearing in Book 10 to approximate the nurturing and salvific roles of both her and Adam's antitypes underlines Adam's failure to achieve any such approximation, in spite of its having been possible. Finally, both Adam's and Eve's language in the scene that culminates in Adam's fall echoes parodically the language of the Son's offering of himself in Book 3, the angels' exclamatory response to that offer, and the language of the Bible itself as it relates to Christ's normative and typological self-sacrifice on behalf of his less than immaculate spouse. It was a model which Adam did not exemplify. But if we gaze at the scene's spotted surface through the telescope of typology, I think we will conclude that he could have, and should have.6

University of British Columbia

NOTES

1 I here in part summarize some of the conclusions of my Milton's Good God and those of others such as Evans and Lewalski.
THE DESCENT OF URANIA


WILLIAM B. HUNTER

For almost half a century William B. Hunter has been exploring the life and works of John Milton. The present collection, *The Descent of Urania*, contains twenty-two of his best essays written during these years. A few of the studies gathered here have been slightly revised in the light of further investigations. One recently written appears here for the first time; it concerns the issue of Milton's relations with the then nascent but already powerful Presbyterian church. Because Milton was knowledgeable in so many fields, the collection investigates a wide variety of subjects fundamental to an understanding of the seventeenth century. $42.50

"SUCH PROMPT ELOQUENCE"

Language as Agency and Character in Milton’s Epics

LEONARD MUSTAZZA

Milton’s regard for language as agency and character is discernible in virtually every one of his major poems, but is nowhere more evident than in his epics, *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained*. In "Such Prompt Eloquence," Leonard Mustazza closely traces in these great works the various characters' uses of words and shows that Milton considered language both a medium of communication and a mirror of the inner person. At every turn, the characters use words to instruct and persuade others, to understand themselves and their environments, to express emotion, and to impel themselves or others to act, and Mustazza explores how each of these uses of language leads the reader to a precise understanding of the characters. $28.50

THE HIEROGLYPHIC KING

Wisdom and Idolatry in the Seventeenth-Century Masque

STEPHEN KOGAN

*The Hieroglyphic King* presents a new interpretation of the Stuart masque, which places the form in the context of its intellectual history and the controversies of the time. In its reading of the masque, the study combines the traditional emphasis on Jonson with recent reevaluations of Inigo Jones and the Caroline poets. It closely examines both the major and the secondary authors in the masque tradition, the general issues they addressed in their poetry and masques, and the historic moment that they helped to define. This work was the winner of the Fairleigh Dickinson University Press Award for the best manuscript in Renaissance drama. $45.00

AT YOUR BOOKSELLER OR DIRECT FROM

Associated University Presses

440 Forsgate Drive, Cranbury, New Jersey 08512
The recent dialogue in MQ between Walker and Fallon is well worth reviewing in connection with this crucial line.

On Milton and typology, see for example Madsen, Jordan, Labriola, Tayler (chap. 3), and Watson.

This formulation of the Eve/Mary relationship is quoted from, and illustrated by, an altar painting by Giorgio Vasari in the Cappella Altoviti, Florence. See Guldan 229 and plate 171.

See also Fish 261-72. Leonard (chap. 4) pursues on more linguistic and less typological grounds a similar argument regarding the possibility and desirability of the unfallen Adam's sacrificing himself for fallen Eve.

A version of this paper was presented at the Third International Milton Symposium in June, 1988.

WORKS CITED


